RFC8910

From RFC-Wiki
Revision as of 21:58, 22 September 2020 by Admin (talk | contribs) (Created page with " Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. Kumari Request for Comments: 8910 Google Obsoletes: 7710...")
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)




Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. Kumari Request for Comments: 8910 Google Obsoletes: 7710 E. Kline Updates: 3679 Loon Category: Standards Track September 2020 ISSN: 2070-1721


Captive-Portal Identification in DHCP and Router Advertisements (RAs)

Abstract

  In many environments offering short-term or temporary Internet access
  (such as coffee shops), it is common to start new connections in a
  captive portal mode.  This highly restricts what the user can do
  until the user has satisfied the captive portal conditions.
  This document describes a DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 option and a Router
  Advertisement (RA) option to inform clients that they are behind some
  sort of captive portal enforcement device, and that they will need to
  satisfy the Captive Portal conditions to get Internet access.  It is
  not a full solution to address all of the issues that clients may
  have with captive portals; it is designed to be one component of a
  standardized approach for hosts to interact with such portals.  While
  this document defines how the network operator may convey the captive
  portal API endpoint to hosts, the specific methods of satisfying and
  interacting with the captive portal are out of scope of this
  document.
  This document replaces RFC 7710, which used DHCP code point 160.  Due
  to a conflict, this document specifies 114.  Consequently, this
  document also updates RFC 3679.

Status of This Memo

  This is an Internet Standards Track document.
  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8910.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.
  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
  the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
  described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

  1.  Introduction
    1.1.  Requirements Notation
  2.  The Captive-Portal Option
    2.1.  IPv4 DHCP Option
    2.2.  IPv6 DHCP Option
    2.3.  The Captive-Portal IPv6 RA Option
  3.  Precedence of API URIs
  4.  IANA Considerations
    4.1.  Captive Portal Unrestricted Identifier
    4.2.  BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options Code Change
    4.3.  Update DHCPv6 and IPv6 ND Options Registries
  5.  Security Considerations
  6.  References
    6.1.  Normative References
    6.2.  Informative References
  Appendix A.  Changes from RFC 7710
  Appendix B.  Observations from IETF 106 Network Experiment
  Acknowledgements
  Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

  In many environments, users need to connect to a captive portal
  device and agree to an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) and/or provide
  billing information before they can access the Internet.  Regardless
  of how that mechanism operates, this document provides functionality
  to allow the client to know when it is behind a captive portal and
  how to contact it.
  In order to present users with the payment or AUP pages, a captive
  portal enforcement device presently has to intercept the user's
  connections and redirect the user to a captive portal server, using
  methods that are very similar to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
  As increasing focus is placed on security, and end nodes adopt a more
  secure stance, these interception techniques will become less
  effective and/or more intrusive.
  This document describes a DHCPv4 [RFC2131] and DHCPv6 [RFC8415]
  option (Captive-Portal) and an IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA)
  [RFC4861] option that informs clients that they are behind a captive
  portal enforcement device and the API endpoint that the host can
  contact for more information.
  This document replaces RFC 7710 [RFC7710], which used DHCP code point
  160.  Due to a conflict, this document specifies 114.  Consequently,
  this document also updates [RFC3679].

1.1. Requirements Notation

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
  "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
  BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
  capitals, as shown here.

2. The Captive-Portal Option

  The Captive-Portal DHCP/RA Option informs the client that it may be
  behind a captive portal and provides the URI to access an API as
  defined by [RFC8908].  This is primarily intended to improve the user
  experience by showing the user the captive portal information faster
  and more reliably.  Note that, for the foreseeable future, captive
  portals will still need to implement interception techniques to serve
  legacy clients, and clients will need to perform probing to detect
  captive portals; nonetheless, the mechanism provided by this document
  provides a more reliable and performant way to do so, and is
  therefore the preferred mechanism for captive portal detection.
  Clients that support the Captive Portal DHCP option SHOULD include
  the option in the Parameter Request List in DHCPREQUEST messages.
  DHCP servers MAY send the Captive Portal option without any explicit
  request.
  In order to support multiple "classes" of clients (e.g., IPv4 only,
  IPv6 only with DHCPv6 ([RFC8415]), and IPv6 only with RA), the
  captive network can provision the client with the URI via multiple
  methods (IPv4 DHCP, IPv6 DHCP, and IPv6 RA).  The captive portal
  operator SHOULD ensure that the URIs provisioned by each method are
  identical to reduce the chance of operational problems.  As the
  maximum length of the URI that can be carried in IPv4 DHCP is 255
  bytes, URIs longer than this SHOULD NOT be provisioned by any of the
  IPv6 options described in this document.  In IPv6-only environments,
  this restriction can be relaxed.
  In all variants of this option, the URI MUST be that of the captive
  portal API endpoint ([RFC8908]).
  A captive portal MAY do content negotiation (Section 3.4 of
  [RFC7231]) and attempt to redirect clients querying without an
  explicit indication of support for the captive portal API content
  type (i.e., without application/capport+json listed explicitly
  anywhere within an Accept header field as described in Section 5.3 of
  [RFC7231]).  In so doing, the captive portal SHOULD redirect the
  client to the value associated with the "user-portal-url" API key.
  When performing such content negotiation (Section 3.4 of [RFC7231]),
  implementors of captive portals need to keep in mind that such
  responses might be cached, and therefore SHOULD include an
  appropriate Vary header field (Section 7.1.4 of [RFC7231]) or set the
  Cache-Control header field in any responses to "private" or a more
  restrictive value such as "no-store" (Section 5.2.2.3 of [RFC7234]).
  The URI SHOULD NOT contain an IP address literal.  Exceptions to this
  might include networks with only one operational IP address family
  where DNS is either not available or not fully functional until the
  captive portal has been satisfied.  Use of IP Address certificates
  ([RFC3779]) adds considerations that are out of scope for this
  document.
  Networks with no captive portals may explicitly indicate this
  condition by using this option with the IANA-assigned URI for this
  purpose.  Clients observing the URI value
  "urn:ietf:params:capport:unrestricted" may forego time-consuming
  forms of captive portal detection.

2.1. IPv4 DHCP Option

  The format of the IPv4 Captive-Portal DHCP option is shown below.
      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Code          | Len           | URI (variable length) ...     |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     .                   ...URI continued...                         .
     |                              ...                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
              Figure 1: Captive-Portal DHCPv4 Option Format
     Code:  The Captive-Portal DHCPv4 Option (114) (one octet).
     Len:  The length (one octet), in octets, of the URI.
     URI:  The URI for the captive portal API endpoint to which the
        user should connect (encoded following the rules in [RFC3986]).
  See Section 2 of [RFC2132] for more on the format of IPv4 DHCP
  options.
  Note that the URI parameter is not null terminated.

2.2. IPv6 DHCP Option

  The format of the IPv6 Captive-Portal DHCP option is shown below.
      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          option-code          |          option-len           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     .                      URI (variable length)                    .
     |                              ...                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
              Figure 2: Captive-Portal DHCPv6 Option Format
     option-code:  The Captive-Portal DHCPv6 Option (103) (two octets).
     option-len:  The unsigned 16-bit length, in octets, of the URI.
     URI:  The URI for the captive portal API endpoint to which the
        user should connect (encoded following the rules in [RFC3986]).
  See Section 5.7 of [RFC7227] for more examples of DHCP Options with
  URIs.  See Section 21.1 of [RFC8415] for more on the format of IPv6
  DHCP options.
  Note that the URI parameter is not null terminated.
  As the maximum length of the URI that can be carried in IPv4 DHCP is
  255 bytes, URIs longer than this SHOULD NOT be provisioned via IPv6
  DHCP options.

2.3. The Captive-Portal IPv6 RA Option

  This section describes the Captive-Portal Router Advertisement
  option.
      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |     Length    |              URI              .
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               .
     .                                                               .
     .                                                               .
     .                                                               .
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                Figure 3: Captive-Portal RA Option Format
     Type:  37
     Length:  8-bit unsigned integer.  The length of the option
        (including the Type and Length fields) in units of 8 bytes.
     URI:  The URI for the captive portal API endpoint to which the
        user should connect.  This MUST be padded with NUL (0x00) to
        make the total option length (including the Type and Length
        fields) a multiple of 8 bytes.
  Note that the URI parameter is not guaranteed to be null terminated.
  As the maximum length of the URI that can be carried in IPv4 DHCP is
  255 bytes, URIs longer than this SHOULD NOT be provisioned via IPv6
  RA options.

3. Precedence of API URIs

  A device may learn about Captive Portal API URIs through more than
  one of (or indeed all of) the above options.  Implementations can
  select their own precedence order (e.g., prefer one of the IPv6
  options before the DHCPv4 option, or vice versa, et cetera).
  If the URIs learned via more than one option described in Section 2
  are not all identical, this condition should be logged for the device
  owner or administrator; it is a network configuration error if the
  learned URIs are not all identical.

4. IANA Considerations

  IANA has registered a new IETF URN protocol parameter ([RFC3553]).
  IANA has also reallocated two DHCPv4 option codes (see Appendix B for
  background) and updated the references for previously registered
  DHCPv6 and IPv6 ND options.

4.1. Captive Portal Unrestricted Identifier

  IANA has registered a new entry in the "IETF URN Sub-namespace for
  Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers" registry defined in
  [RFC3553]:
  Registered Parameter Identifier:  capport:unrestricted
  Reference:  RFC 8910
  IANA Registry Reference:  RFC 8910
  Only one value is defined (see URN above).  No hierarchy is defined
  and, therefore, no sub-namespace registrations are possible.

4.2. BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options Code Change

  IANA has updated the "BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options"
  registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters) as
  follows.
  Tag:  114
  Name:  DHCP Captive-Portal
  Data Length:  N
  Meaning:  DHCP Captive-Portal
  Reference:  RFC 8910
  Tag:  160
  Name:  Unassigned
  Data Length:
  Meaning:  Previously assigned by [RFC7710]; known to also be used by
     Polycom.
  Reference:  [RFC7710] RFC 8910

4.3. Update DHCPv6 and IPv6 ND Options Registries

  IANA has updated the DHCPv6 (103 - DHCP Captive-Portal) and IPv6 ND
  (37 - DHCP Captive-Portal) options previously registered in [RFC7710]
  to reference this document.

5. Security Considerations

  By removing or reducing the need for captive portals to perform MITM
  hijacking, this mechanism improves security by making the portal and
  its actions visible, rather than hidden, and reduces the likelihood
  that users will disable useful security safeguards like DNSSEC
  validation, VPNs, etc. in order to interact with the captive portal.
  In addition, because the system knows that it is behind a captive
  portal, it can know not to send cookies, credentials, etc.  By
  handing out a URI that is protected with TLS, the captive portal
  operator can attempt to reassure the user that the captive portal is
  not malicious.
  Clients processing these options SHOULD validate that the option's
  contents conform to the validation requirements for URIs, including
  those described in [RFC3986].
  Each of the options described in this document is presented to a node
  using the same protocols used to provision other information critical
  to the node's successful configuration on a network.  The security
  considerations applicable to each of these provisioning mechanisms
  also apply when the node is attempting to learn the information
  conveyed in these options.  In the absence of security measures like
  RA-Guard ([RFC6105], [RFC7113]) or DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610], an
  attacker could inject, modify, or block DHCP messages or RAs.
  An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs could
  include an option from this document to force users to contact an
  address of the attacker's choosing.  An attacker with this capability
  could simply list themselves as the default gateway (and so intercept
  all the victim's traffic); this does not provide them with
  significantly more capabilities, but because this document removes
  the need for interception, the attacker may have an easier time
  performing the attack.
  However, as the operating systems and application(s) that make use of
  this information know that they are connecting to a captive portal
  device (as opposed to intercepted connections where the OS/
  application may not know that they are connecting to a captive portal
  or hostile device), they can render the page in a sandboxed
  environment and take other precautions such as clearly labeling the
  page as untrusted.  The means of sandboxing and a user interface
  presenting this information is not covered in this document; by its
  nature, it is implementation specific and best left to the
  application and user interface designers.
  Devices and systems that automatically connect to an open network
  could potentially be tracked using the techniques described in this
  document (forcing the user to continually resatisfy the Captive
  Portal conditions or exposing their browser fingerprint).  However,
  similar tracking can already be performed with the presently common
  captive portal mechanisms, so this technique does not give the
  attackers more capabilities.
  Captive portals are increasingly hijacking TLS connections to force
  browsers to talk to the portal.  Providing the portal's URI via a
  DHCP or RA option is a cleaner technique, and reduces user
  expectations of being hijacked; this may improve security by making
  users more reluctant to accept TLS hijacking, which can be performed
  from beyond the network associated with the captive portal.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

  [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
  [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
             RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.
  [RFC2132]  Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
             Extensions", RFC 2132, DOI 10.17487/RFC2132, March 1997,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2132>.
  [RFC3553]  Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
             IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
             Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, DOI 10.17487/RFC3553, June
             2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3553>.
  [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
             Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
             RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
  [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
             "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
  [RFC7227]  Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
             S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
             BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.
  [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
             Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
  [RFC7234]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
             Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
             RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.
  [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
             2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
             May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
  [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
             Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
             "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
             RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

6.2. Informative References

  [RFC3679]  Droms, R., "Unused Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
             (DHCP) Option Codes", RFC 3679, DOI 10.17487/RFC3679,
             January 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3679>.
  [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
             Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
  [RFC6105]  Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
             Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>.
  [RFC7113]  Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
             Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC7113, February 2014,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7113>.
  [RFC7610]  Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
             Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
             RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610>.
  [RFC7710]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., Ebersman, P., and S. Sheng,
             "Captive-Portal Identification Using DHCP or Router
             Advertisements (RAs)", RFC 7710, DOI 10.17487/RFC7710,
             December 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7710>.
  [RFC8908]  Pauly, T., Ed. and D. Thakore, Ed., "Captive Portal API",
             RFC 8908, DOI 10.17487/RFC8908, September 2020,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8908>.

Appendix A. Changes from RFC 7710

  This document incorporates the following changes from [RFC7710].
  1.  Clarified that IP string literals are NOT RECOMMENDED.
  2.  Clarified that the option URI MUST be that of the captive portal
      API endpoint.
  3.  Clarified that captive portals MAY do content negotiation.
  4.  Added text about Captive Portal API URI precedence in the event
      of a network configuration error.
  5.  Added urn:ietf:params:capport:unrestricted URN.
  6.  Noted that the DHCPv4 Option Code changed from 160 to 114.

Appendix B. Observations from IETF 106 Network Experiment

  During IETF 106 in Singapore, an experiment
  (https://tickets.meeting.ietf.org/wiki/IETF106network#Experiments)
  enabling clients compatible with the Captive Portal API to discover a
  venue-info-url (see experiment description
  (https://tickets.meeting.ietf.org/wiki/CAPPORT) for more detail)
  revealed that some Polycom devices on the same network made use of
  DHCPv4 option code 160 for other purposes
  (https://community.polycom.com/t5/VoIP-SIP-Phones/DHCP-
  Standardization-160-vs-66/td-p/72577).
  The presence of DHCPv4 Option code 160 holding a value indicating the
  Captive Portal API URL caused these devices to not function as
  desired.  For this reason, IANA has deprecated option code 160 and
  allocated a different value to be used for the Captive Portal API
  URL.

Acknowledgements

  This document is a -bis of RFC 7710.  Thanks to all of the original
  authors (Warren Kumari, Olafur Gudmundsson, Paul Ebersman, and Steve
  Sheng) and original contributors.
  Also thanks to the CAPPORT WG for all of the discussion and
  improvements, including contributions and review from Joe Clarke,
  Lorenzo Colitti, Dave Dolson, Hans Kuhn, Kyle Larose, Clemens
  Schimpe, Martin Thomson, Michael Richardson, Remi Nguyen Van, Subash
  Tirupachur Comerica, Bernie Volz, and Tommy Pauly.

Authors' Addresses

  Warren Kumari
  Google
  1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
  Mountain View, CA 94043
  United States of America
  Email: [email protected]


  Erik Kline
  Loon
  1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
  Mountain View, CA 94043
  United States of America
  Email: [email protected]