RFC6444
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Schulzrinne Request for Comments: 6444 Columbia University Category: Informational L. Liess ISSN: 2070-1721 Deutsche Telekom
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
B. Stark
AT&T
A. Kuett
Skype
January 2012
Location Hiding: Problem Statement and Requirements
Abstract
The emergency services architecture developed in the IETF Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technology (ECRIT) working group describes an architecture where location information is provided by access networks to endpoints or Voice over IP (VoIP) service providers in order to determine the correct dial string and information to route the call to a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP). To determine the PSAP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), the usage of the Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) protocol is envisioned.
This document provides a problem statement and lists requirements for situations where the Internet Access Provider (IAP) and/or the Internet Service Provider (ISP) are only willing to disclose limited or no location information.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6444.
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Contents
Introduction
Emergency Services Architecture
The emergency services architecture developed in the IETF Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technology (ECRIT) working group, see RFC6443, describes an architecture where location information is provided by access networks to endpoints or VoIP service providers in order to determine the correct dial string and information to route the call to a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP). The Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) protocol RFC5222 allows callers and other call-routing entities to determine the PSAP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) for a specific geographical location together with a service URN RFC5031. The basic architecture is shown in Figure 1 of RFC6443 and further detailed in the message flow in Figure 2 of RFC6443.
For emergency services, location information is needed for three purposes:
1. Emergency call routing to the PSAP that is responsible for a
specific geographical region.
2. Dispatch of the emergency personnel to the scene of an accident,
crime, or other type of incident.
3. Additionally, a Voice Service Provider (VSP) may need to verify
that a call is indeed an emergency call and may therefore require location information to ensure that calls routed to a specific URI point to a PSAP.
This document focuses on items (1) and (3). Providing location information by the ISP to emergency authorities, including PSAPs, regional emergency management association, and emergency personnel is typically a legal obligation covered by regulatory frameworks.
Location Hiding
Internet Access Providers (IAPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) typically have little incentive to provide location information to end hosts or independent VSPs (without monetary compensation) for any purpose, including for emergency call routing. The decision to deny disclosure of location information can be driven by a number of technical and business concerns. Some providers may perceive a risk that allowing users to access location information for non-emergency purposes or prior to an emergency call will incur additional server load and thus costs. Other providers may not want
to make location information available without the ability to charge for it. Yet, others fear problems with regard to privacy when disclosing location information to potentially unknown third parties.
Location by Reference
The work on the Location Configuration Protocol (LCP) indicated the need to provide the capability to obtain Location-by-References (LbyRs) in addition to Location-by-Value (LbyV) from a Location Information Server (LIS).
The LCP problem statement and requirements document is RFC5687. The requirements for obtaining an LbyR via the LCP and the corresponding dereferencing step can be found in RFC5808.
HTTP Enabled Location Delivery (HELD), see RFC5985, is an instantiation of the LCP concept and allows LbyVs and LbyRs to be requested.
A location reference may already satisfy the requirement for location hiding if the PSAP has the appropriate credentials to resolve the reference. These credentials allow the ISP/IAP to authenticate and to authorize the party that would like to request location information. The policy to obtain these credentials allows ISPs/IAPs to put constraints under which these credentials are handed out. ISPs/IAPs ideally might want to engage in a business relationship with the VSP to receive a financial compensation for the service they provide. On the Internet, the number of VSPs is potentially large and the VSPs would not want to enter a business contract with potentially every ISP/IAP worldwide. The number of potential contracts between ISPs/IAPs and PSAPs is, however, relatively small as they typically need to have a local relationship as PSAPs provide their emergency services support in a certain geographical region for which certain ISPs/IAPs have networks deployed.
Note that the requirement being met here is for delivery of location information to the PSAP, not for LoST routing or for validation at the VSP. Since LoST RFC5222 requires location by value, location by reference cannot be used for location-based routing. Also, LoST servers may be operated by independent parties, including VSPs, which again may not be able to resolve the reference to location by value. (Note that LoST is a protocol used for determining the location- appropriate PSAP based on location information and a Service URN RFC5031.)
Terminology
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119, with the important qualification that, unless otherwise stated, these terms apply to the design of an solution supporting location hiding, not its implementation or application.
This document reuses terminology from RFC5687.
Requirements
Req-1: There MUST be a way for the ISP/IAP to withhold precise
location information from the endpoint and from the VSP.
Req-2: The ISP/IAP MUST support the ability of the endpoint or the
VSP to route emergency calls.
Req-3: The VSP MUST be able to validate that a call purported to be
an emergency call is being routed to a bona fide URI, which
is denoted by being a URI in LoST for the designated
emergency service. This requirement is provided to deal
with potential security problems described in Section 5.1 of
RFC5069.
Req-4: The PSAP MUST receive precise location information (by
value) about emergency callers. As such, any solution MUST
be able to provide location information to the PSAP even
while withholding it from the emergency caller.
Req-5: The proposed solution MUST NOT assume a business or trust
relationship between the caller's VSP and the caller's ISP.
Req-6: A solution MUST consider deployment scenarios where a VSP
does not operate in the same jurisdiction as the PSAP.
Req-7: The solution MUST consider that service boundaries for the
various emergency services responsible for a particular
location may differ.
Req-8: The steps needed by the endpoint for emergency calling
SHOULD be no different when location is withheld versus when
location is not withheld. In particular, user agents cannot
require additional configuration to discover in which
particular environment (hiding or no hiding) they find
themselves.
Req-9: The solution SHOULD work without the ISP/IAP having to
support SIP and without the need to utilize SIP between the
endpoint and the VSP.
Req-10: The solution MUST work if PSAP boundaries have holes. (For
a discussion about holes in PSAP boundaries and their
encoding, the reader is referred to RFC5964.)
Req-11: The solution MUST NOT assume the existence of Emergency
Service Routing Proxies (ESRPs) per country, state, and
city.
Req-12: The solution MUST consider that service boundaries for
different emergency services may differ, but they overlap at
the location of the caller.
Req-13: Though the solution MAY add steps to the emergency call
routing process described in RFC6443, these steps MUST NOT significantly increase call setup latency. For example, the revised process MUST NOT include "trial-and-error" operations on its critical path, such as attempts at LbyR resolutions that may take time to time out.
Req-14: The solution MUST allow the end host to determine PSAP/ESRP
URLs prior to the call, for all emergency services.
Req-15: The solution MUST allow user agents (UAs) to discover at
least their dial string ahead of the emergency call.
Req-16: The solution MUST have minimal impact on UAs, i.e., a
solution is preferred if it does not require a substantially
different emergency service procedure compared to the
procedure of dealing with emergency services where no
location hiding is applied.
Req-17: The solution MUST NOT interfere with the use of LoST for
non-emergency services.
Req-18: The solution MUST allow emergency calls to reach an IP-to-
PSTN gateway rather than the IP-based PSAP directly.
Req-19: The solution MUST NOT shift effort (externality), i.e., the
convenience of the location-hiding ISP MUST NOT impose a
burden on user agents or non-hiding ISPs/IAPs and SHOULD NOT
impose a burden on VSPs.
Req-20: The solution SHOULD minimize the impact on LoST, SIP
conveyance RFC6442, and DHCP.
Req-21: The solution SHOULD NOT break in the presence of NATs and
SHOULD consider the presence of legacy devices, as described
in RFC5687.
Security Considerations
This document does not raise additional security consideration beyond those mentioned in RFC5687 and discussed in this document.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the following ECRIT working group members (in no particular order) for their contributions:
o Andrew Newton ([email protected])
o James Winterbottom ([email protected])
o Brian Rosen ([email protected])
o Richard Barnes ([email protected])
o Marc Linsner ([email protected])
o Ted Hardie ([email protected])
The authors would also like to thank Ben Campbell for his Gen-ART review. Additionally, we would like to thank Jari Arkko, Alexey Melnikov, Tim Polk, and Dan Romascanu for their IESG review.
Normative References
RFC2119 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
RFC5031 Schulzrinne, H., "A Uniform Resource Name (URN) for
Emergency and Other Well-Known Services", RFC 5031, January 2008.
RFC5069 Taylor, T., Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., and M.
Shanmugam, "Security Threats and Requirements for
Emergency Call Marking and Mapping", RFC 5069,
January 2008.
RFC5222 Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H.
Tschofenig, "LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation
Protocol", RFC 5222, August 2008.
RFC5687 Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, "GEOPRIV Layer 7
Location Configuration Protocol: Problem Statement and
Requirements", RFC 5687, March 2010.
RFC5808 Marshall, R., "Requirements for a Location-by-Reference
Mechanism", RFC 5808, May 2010.
RFC5964 Winterbottom, J. and M. Thomson, "Specifying Holes in
Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) Service
Boundaries", RFC 5964, August 2010.
RFC5985 Barnes, M., "HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)",
RFC 5985, September 2010.
RFC6442 Polk, J., Rosen, B., and J. Peterson, "Location Conveyance
for the Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 6442, December 2011.
RFC6443 Rosen, B., Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and A. Newton,
"Framework for Emergency Calling Using Internet
Multimedia", RFC 6443, December 2011.
Authors' Addresses
Henning Schulzrinne Columbia University Department of Computer Science 450 Computer Science Building New York, NY 10027 US Phone: +1 212 939 7004 EMail: [email protected] URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu
Laura Liess Deutsche Telekom Networks Deutsche Telekom Allee 7 Darmstadt, Hessen 64295 Germany Phone: EMail: [email protected] URI: http://www.telekom.de
Hannes Tschofenig Nokia Siemens Networks Linnoitustie 6 Espoo 02600 Finland Phone: +358 (50) 4871445 EMail: [email protected] URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Barbara Stark AT&T 725 W Peachtree St, NE Atlanta, GA 30308 USA Phone: +1 404 499 7026 EMail: [email protected]
Andres Kuett Skype EMail: [email protected]
