RFC7719

From RFC-Wiki

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Hoffman Request for Comments: 7719 ICANN Category: Informational A. Sullivan ISSN: 2070-1721 Dyn

                                                         K. Fujiwara
                                                                JPRS
                                                       December 2015
                        DNS Terminology

Abstract

The DNS is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has sometimes changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.

Status of This Memo

This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Introduction

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a simple query-response protocol whose messages in both directions have the same format. The protocol and message format are defined in RFC1034 and RFC1035. These RFCs defined some terms, but later documents defined others. Some of the terms from RFCs 1034 and 1035 now have somewhat different meanings than they did in 1987.

This document collects a wide variety of DNS-related terms. Some of them have been precisely defined in earlier RFCs, some have been loosely defined in earlier RFCs, and some are not defined in any earlier RFC at all.

Most of the definitions here are the consensus definition of the DNS community -- both protocol developers and operators. Some of the definitions differ from earlier RFCs, and those differences are noted. In this document, where the consensus definition is the same as the one in an RFC, that RFC is quoted. Where the consensus definition has changed somewhat, the RFC is mentioned but the new stand-alone definition is given.

It is important to note that, during the development of this document, it became clear that some DNS-related terms are interpreted quite differently by different DNS experts. Further, some terms that are defined in early DNS RFCs now have definitions that are generally agreed to, but that are different from the original definitions. Therefore, the authors intend to follow this document with a substantial revision in the not-distant future. That revision will probably have more in-depth discussion of some terms as well as new terms; it will also update some of the RFCs with new definitions.

The terms are organized loosely by topic. Some definitions are for new terms for things that are commonly talked about in the DNS community but that never had terms defined for them.

Other organizations sometimes define DNS-related terms their own way. For example, the W3C defines "domain" at https://specs.webplatform.org/url/webspecs/develop/.

Note that there is no single consistent definition of "the DNS". It can be considered to be some combination of the following: a commonly used naming scheme for objects on the Internet; a distributed database representing the names and certain properties of these objects; an architecture providing distributed maintenance, resilience, and loose coherency for this database; and a simple query-response protocol (as mentioned below) implementing this architecture.

Capitalization in DNS terms is often inconsistent among RFCs and various DNS practitioners. The capitalization used in this document is a best guess at current practices, and is not meant to indicate that other capitalization styles are wrong or archaic. In some cases, multiple styles of capitalization are used for the same term due to quoting from different RFCs.

Names

Domain name: Section 3.1 of RFC1034 talks of "the domain name

  space" as a tree structure.  "Each node has a label, which is zero
  to 63 octets in length. ... The domain name of a node is the list
  of the labels on the path from the node to the root of the tree.
  ... To simplify implementations, the total number of octets that
  represent a domain name (i.e., the sum of all label octets and
  label lengths) is limited to 255."  Any label in a domain name can
  contain any octet value.

Fully qualified domain name (FQDN): This is often just a clear way

  of saying the same thing as "domain name of a node", as outlined
  above.  However, the term is ambiguous.  Strictly speaking, a
  fully qualified domain name would include every label, including
  the final, zero-length label of the root: such a name would be
  written "www.example.net." (note the terminating dot).  But
  because every name eventually shares the common root, names are
  often written relative to the root (such as "www.example.net") and
  are still called "fully qualified".  This term first appeared in
  RFC819.  In this document, names are often written relative to
  the root.
  The need for the term "fully qualified domain name" comes from the
  existence of partially qualified domain names, which are names
  where some of the right-most names are left off and are understood
  only by context.

Label: The identifier of an individual node in the sequence of nodes

  identified by a fully qualified domain name.

Host name: This term and its equivalent, "hostname", have been

  widely used but are not defined in RFC1034, RFC1035,
  RFC1123, or RFC2181.  The DNS was originally deployed into the
  Host Tables environment as outlined in RFC952, and it is likely
  that the term followed informally from the definition there.  Over
  time, the definition seems to have shifted.  "Host name" is often
  meant to be a domain name that follows the rules in Section 3.5 of
  RFC1034, the "preferred name syntax".  Note that any label in a
  domain name can contain any octet value; hostnames are generally
  considered to be domain names where every label follows the rules
  in the "preferred name syntax", with the amendment that labels can
  start with ASCII digits (this amendment comes from Section 2.1 of
  RFC1123).
  People also sometimes use the term hostname to refer to just the
  first label of an FQDN, such as "printer" in
  "printer.admin.example.com".  (Sometimes this is formalized in
  configuration in operating systems.)  In addition, people
  sometimes use this term to describe any name that refers to a
  machine, and those might include labels that do not conform to the
  "preferred name syntax".

TLD: A Top-Level Domain, meaning a zone that is one layer below the

  root, such as "com" or "jp".  There is nothing special, from the
  point of view of the DNS, about TLDs.  Most of them are also
  delegation-centric zones, and there are significant policy issues
  around their operation.  TLDs are often divided into sub-groups
  such as Country Code Top-Level Domains (ccTLDs), Generic Top-Level
  Domains (gTLDs), and others; the division is a matter of policy,
  and beyond the scope of this document.

IDN: The common abbreviation for "Internationalized Domain Name".

  The IDNA protocol is the standard mechanism for handling domain
  names with non-ASCII characters in applications in the DNS.  The
  current standard, normally called "IDNA2008", is defined in
  RFC5890, RFC5891, RFC5892, RFC5893, and RFC5894.  These
  documents define many IDN-specific terms such as "LDH label",
  "A-label", and "U-label".  RFC6365 defines more terms that
  relate to internationalization (some of which relate to IDNs), and
  RFC6055 has a much more extensive discussion of IDNs, including
  some new terminology.

Subdomain: "A domain is a subdomain of another domain if it is

  contained within that domain.  This relationship can be tested by
  seeing if the subdomain's name ends with the containing domain's
  name."  (Quoted from RFC1034, Section 3.1).  For example, in the
  host name "nnn.mmm.example.com", both "mmm.example.com" and
  "nnn.mmm.example.com" are subdomains of "example.com".

Alias: The owner of a CNAME resource record, or a subdomain of the

  owner of a DNAME resource record RFC6672.  See also "canonical
  name".

Canonical name: A CNAME resource record "identifies its owner name

  as an alias, and specifies the corresponding canonical name in the
  RDATA section of the RR."  (Quoted from RFC1034, Section 3.6.2)
  This usage of the word "canonical" is related to the mathematical
  concept of "canonical form".

CNAME: "It is traditional to refer to the owner of a CNAME record as

  'a CNAME'.  This is unfortunate, as 'CNAME' is an abbreviation of
  'canonical name', and the owner of a CNAME record is an alias, not
  a canonical name."  (Quoted from RFC2181, Section 10.1.1)

Public suffix: "A domain that is controlled by a public registry."

  (Quoted from RFC6265, Section 5.3) A common definition for this
  term is a domain under which subdomains can be registered, and on
  which HTTP cookies (RFC6265) should not be set.  There is no
  indication in a domain name whether it is a public suffix; that
  can only be determined by outside means.  In fact, both a domain
  and a subdomain of that domain can be public suffixes.  At the
  time this document is published, the IETF DBOUND Working Group
  [DBOUND] is dealing with issues concerning public suffixes.
  There is nothing inherent in a domain name to indicate whether it
  is a public suffix.  One resource for identifying public suffixes
  is the Public Suffix List (PSL) maintained by Mozilla
  (http://publicsuffix.org/).
  For example, at the time this document is published, the "com.au"
  domain is listed as a public suffix in the PSL.  (Note that this
  example might change in the future.)
  Note that the term "public suffix" is controversial in the DNS
  community for many reasons, and may be significantly changed in
  the future.  One example of the difficulty of calling a domain a
  public suffix is that designation can change over time as the
  registration policy for the zone changes, such as the case of the
  "uk" TLD around the time this document is published.

DNS Header and Response Codes

The header of a DNS message is its first 12 octets. Many of the fields and flags in the header diagram in Sections 4.1.1 through 4.1.3 of RFC1035 are referred to by their names in that diagram. For example, the response codes are called "RCODEs", the data for a record is called the "RDATA", and the authoritative answer bit is often called "the AA flag" or "the AA bit".

Some of response codes that are defined in RFC1035 have gotten their own shorthand names. Some common response code names that appear without reference to the numeric value are "FORMERR", "SERVFAIL", and "NXDOMAIN" (the latter of which is also referred to as "Name Error"). All of the RCODEs are listed at http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters, although that site uses mixed-case capitalization, while most documents use all-caps.

NODATA: "A pseudo RCODE which indicates that the name is valid for

  the given class, but there are no records of the given type.  A
  NODATA response has to be inferred from the answer."  (Quoted from
  RFC2308, Section 1.)  "NODATA is indicated by an answer with the
  RCODE set to NOERROR and no relevant answers in the answer
  section.  The authority section will contain an SOA record, or
  there will be no NS records there."  (Quoted from RFC2308,
  Section 2.2.)  Note that referrals have a similar format to NODATA
  replies; RFC2308 explains how to distinguish them.
  The term "NXRRSET" is sometimes used as a synonym for NODATA.
  However, this is a mistake, given that NXRRSET is a specific error
  code defined in RFC2136.

Negative response: A response that indicates that a particular RRset

  does not exist, or whose RCODE indicates the nameserver cannot
  answer.  Sections 2 and 7 of RFC2308 describe the types of
  negative responses in detail.

Referrals: Data from the authority section of a non-authoritative

  answer.  RFC1035 Section 2.1 defines "authoritative" data.
  However, referrals at zone cuts (defined in Section 6) are not
  authoritative.  Referrals may be zone cut NS resource records and
  their glue records.  NS records on the parent side of a zone cut
  are an authoritative delegation, but are normally not treated as
  authoritative data.  In general, a referral is a way for a server
  to send an answer saying that the server does not know the answer,
  but knows where the query should be directed in order to get an
  answer.  Historically, many authoritative servers answered with a
  referral to the root zone when queried for a name for which they
  were not authoritative, but this practice has declined.

Resource Records

RR: An acronym for resource record. (RFC1034, Section 3.6.)

RRset: A set of resource records with the same label, class and

  type, but with different data.  (Definition from RFC2181) Also
  spelled RRSet in some documents.  As a clarification, "same label"
  in this definition means "same owner name".  In addition,
  RFC2181 states that "the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the
  same".  (This definition is definitely not the same as "the
  response one gets to a query for QTYPE=ANY", which is an
  unfortunate misunderstanding.)

EDNS: The extension mechanisms for DNS, defined in RFC6891.

  Sometimes called "EDNS0" or "EDNS(0)" to indicate the version
  number.  EDNS allows DNS clients and servers to specify message
  sizes larger than the original 512 octet limit, to expand the
  response code space, and potentially to carry additional options
  that affect the handling of a DNS query.

OPT: A pseudo-RR (sometimes called a "meta-RR") that is used only to

  contain control information pertaining to the question-and-answer
  sequence of a specific transaction.  (Definition from RFC6891,
  Section 6.1.1) It is used by EDNS.

Owner: The domain name where a RR is found (RFC1034, Section 3.6).

  Often appears in the term "owner name".

SOA field names: DNS documents, including the definitions here,

  often refer to the fields in the RDATA of an SOA resource record
  by field name.  Those fields are defined in Section 3.3.13 of
  RFC1035.  The names (in the order they appear in the SOA RDATA)
  are MNAME, RNAME, SERIAL, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE, and MINIMUM.
  Note that the meaning of MINIMUM field is updated in Section 4 of
  RFC2308; the new definition is that the MINIMUM field is only
  "the TTL to be used for negative responses".  This document tends
  to use field names instead of terms that describe the fields.

TTL: The maximum "time to live" of a resource record. "A TTL value

  is an unsigned number, with a minimum value of 0, and a maximum
  value of 2147483647.  That is, a maximum of 2^31 - 1.  When
  transmitted, the TTL is encoded in the less significant 31 bits of
  the 32 bit TTL field, with the most significant, or sign, bit set
  to zero."  (Quoted from RFC2181, Section 8) (Note that RFC1035
  erroneously stated that this is a signed integer; that was fixed
  by RFC2181.)
  The TTL "specifies the time interval that the resource record may
  be cached before the source of the information should again be
  consulted".  (Quoted from RFC1035, Section 3.2.1) Also: "the
  time interval (in seconds) that the resource record may be cached
  before it should be discarded".  (Quoted from RFC1035,
  Section 4.1.3).  Despite being defined for a resource record, the
  TTL of every resource record in an RRset is required to be the
  same (RFC2181, Section 5.2).
  The reason that the TTL is the maximum time to live is that a
  cache operator might decide to shorten the time to live for
  operational purposes, such as if there is a policy to disallow TTL
  values over a certain number.  Also, if a value is flushed from
  the cache when its value is still positive, the value effectively
  becomes zero.  Some servers are known to ignore the TTL on some
  RRsets (such as when the authoritative data has a very short TTL)
  even though this is against the advice in RFC 1035.
  There is also the concept of a "default TTL" for a zone, which can
  be a configuration parameter in the server software.  This is
  often expressed by a default for the entire server, and a default
  for a zone using the $TTL directive in a zone file.  The $TTL
  directive was added to the master file format by RFC2308.

Class independent: A resource record type whose syntax and semantics

  are the same for every DNS class.  A resource record type that is
  not class independent has different meanings depending on the DNS
  class of the record, or the meaning is undefined for classes other
  than IN (class 1, the Internet).

DNS Servers and Clients

This section defines the terms used for the systems that act as DNS clients, DNS servers, or both.

Resolver: A program "that extract[s] information from name servers

  in response to client requests."  (Quoted from RFC1034,
  Section 2.4) "The resolver is located on the same machine as the
  program that requests the resolver's services, but it may need to
  consult name servers on other hosts."  (Quoted from RFC1034,
  Section 5.1) A resolver performs queries for a name, type, and
  class, and receives answers.  The logical function is called
  "resolution".  In practice, the term is usually referring to some
  specific type of resolver (some of which are defined below), and
  understanding the use of the term depends on understanding the
  context.

Stub resolver: A resolver that cannot perform all resolution itself.

  Stub resolvers generally depend on a recursive resolver to
  undertake the actual resolution function.  Stub resolvers are
  discussed but never fully defined in Section 5.3.1 of RFC1034.
  They are fully defined in Section 6.1.3.1 of RFC1123.

Iterative mode: A resolution mode of a server that receives DNS

  queries and responds with a referral to another server.
  Section 2.3 of RFC1034 describes this as "The server refers the
  client to another server and lets the client pursue the query".  A
  resolver that works in iterative mode is sometimes called an
  "iterative resolver".

Recursive mode: A resolution mode of a server that receives DNS

  queries and either responds to those queries from a local cache or
  sends queries to other servers in order to get the final answers
  to the original queries.  Section 2.3 of RFC1034 describes this
  as "The first server pursues the query for the client at another
  server".  A server operating in recursive mode may be thought of
  as having a name server side (which is what answers the query) and
  a resolver side (which performs the resolution function).  Systems
  operating in this mode are commonly called "recursive servers".
  Sometimes they are called "recursive resolvers".  While strictly
  the difference between these is that one of them sends queries to
  another recursive server and the other does not, in practice it is
  not possible to know in advance whether the server that one is
  querying will also perform recursion; both terms can be observed
  in use interchangeably.

Full resolver: This term is used in RFC1035, but it is not defined

  there.  RFC 1123 defines a "full-service resolver" that may or may
  not be what was intended by "full resolver" in RFC1035.  This
  term is not properly defined in any RFC.

Full-service resolver: Section 6.1.3.1 of RFC1123 defines this

  term to mean a resolver that acts in recursive mode with a cache
  (and meets other requirements).

Priming: The mechanism used by a resolver to determine where to send

  queries before there is anything in the resolver's cache.  Priming
  is most often done from a configuration setting that contains a
  list of authoritative servers for the root zone.

Negative caching: "The storage of knowledge that something does not

  exist, cannot give an answer, or does not give an answer."
  (Quoted from RFC2308, Section 1)

Authoritative server: "A server that knows the content of a DNS zone

  from local knowledge, and thus can answer queries about that zone
  without needing to query other servers."  (Quoted from RFC2182,
  Section 2.)  It is a system that responds to DNS queries with
  information about zones for which it has been configured to answer
  with the AA flag in the response header set to 1.  It is a server
  that has authority over one or more DNS zones.  Note that it is
  possible for an authoritative server to respond to a query without
  the parent zone delegating authority to that server.
  Authoritative servers also provide "referrals", usually to child
  zones delegated from them; these referrals have the AA bit set to
  0 and come with referral data in the Authority and (if needed) the
  Additional sections.

Authoritative-only server: A name server that only serves

  authoritative data and ignores requests for recursion.  It will
  "not normally generate any queries of its own.  Instead, it
  answers non-recursive queries from iterative resolvers looking for
  information in zones it serves."  (Quoted from RFC4697,
  Section 2.4)

Zone transfer: The act of a client requesting a copy of a zone and

  an authoritative server sending the needed information.  (See
  Section 6 for a description of zones.)  There are two common
  standard ways to do zone transfers: the AXFR ("Authoritative
  Transfer") mechanism to copy the full zone (described in
  RFC5936, and the IXFR ("Incremental Transfer") mechanism to copy
  only parts of the zone that have changed (described in RFC1995).
  Many systems use non-standard methods for zone transfer outside
  the DNS protocol.

Secondary server: "An authoritative server which uses zone transfer

  to retrieve the zone" (Quoted from RFC1996, Section 2.1).
  RFC2182 describes secondary servers in detail.  Although early
  DNS RFCs such as RFC1996 referred to this as a "slave", the
  current common usage has shifted to calling it a "secondary".
  Secondary servers are also discussed in RFC1034.

Slave server: See secondary server.

Primary server: "Any authoritative server configured to be the

  source of zone transfer for one or more [secondary] servers"
  (Quoted from RFC1996, Section 2.1) or, more specifically, "an
  authoritative server configured to be the source of AXFR or IXFR
  data for one or more [secondary] servers" (Quoted from RFC2136).
  Although early DNS RFCs such as RFC1996 referred to this as a
  "master", the current common usage has shifted to "primary".
  Primary servers are also discussed in RFC1034.

Master server: See primary server.

Primary master: "The primary master is named in the zone's SOA MNAME

  field and optionally by an NS RR".  (Quoted from RFC1996,
  Section 2.1).  RFC2136 defines "primary master" as "Master
  server at the root of the AXFR/IXFR dependency graph.  The primary
  master is named in the zone's SOA MNAME field and optionally by an
  NS RR.  There is by definition only one primary master server per
  zone."  The idea of a primary master is only used by RFC2136,
  and is considered archaic in other parts of the DNS.

Stealth server: This is "like a slave server except not listed in an

  NS RR for the zone."  (Quoted from RFC1996, Section 2.1)

Hidden master: A stealth server that is a master for zone transfers.

  "In this arrangement, the master name server that processes the
  updates is unavailable to general hosts on the Internet; it is not
  listed in the NS RRset."  (Quoted from RFC6781, Section 3.4.3.)
  An earlier RFC, RFC4641, said that the hidden master's name
  appears in the SOA RRs MNAME field, although in some setups, the
  name does not appear at all in the public DNS.  A hidden master
  can be either a secondary or a primary master.

Forwarding: The process of one server sending a DNS query with the

  RD bit set to 1 to another server to resolve that query.
  Forwarding is a function of a DNS resolver; it is different than
  simply blindly relaying queries.
  RFC5625 does not give a specific definition for forwarding, but
  describes in detail what features a system that forwards need to
  support.  Systems that forward are sometimes called "DNS proxies",
  but that term has not yet been defined (even in RFC5625).

Forwarder: Section 1 of RFC2308 describes a forwarder as "a

  nameserver used to resolve queries instead of directly using the
  authoritative nameserver chain".  RFC2308 further says "The
  forwarder typically either has better access to the internet, or
  maintains a bigger cache which may be shared amongst many
  resolvers."  That definition appears to suggest that forwarders
  normally only query authoritative servers.  In current use,
  however, forwarders often stand between stub resolvers and
  recursive servers.  RFC2308 is silent on whether a forwarder is
  iterative-only or can be a full-service resolver.

Policy-implementing resolver: A resolver acting in recursive mode

  that changes some of the answers that it returns based on policy
  criteria, such as to prevent access to malware sites or
  objectionable content.  In general, a stub resolver has no idea
  whether upstream resolvers implement such policy or, if they do,
  the exact policy about what changes will be made.  In some cases,
  the user of the stub resolver has selected the policy-implementing
  resolver with the explicit intention of using it to implement the
  policies.  In other cases, policies are imposed without the user
  of the stub resolver being informed.

Open resolver: A full-service resolver that accepts and processes

  queries from any (or nearly any) stub resolver.  This is sometimes
  also called a "public resolver", although the term "public
  resolver" is used more with open resolvers that are meant to be
  open, as compared to the vast majority of open resolvers that are
  probably misconfigured to be open.

View: A configuration for a DNS server that allows it to provide

  different answers depending on attributes of the query.
  Typically, views differ by the source IP address of a query, but
  can also be based on the destination IP address, the type of query
  (such as AXFR), whether it is recursive, and so on.  Views are
  often used to provide more names or different addresses to queries
  from "inside" a protected network than to those "outside" that
  network.  Views are not a standardized part of the DNS, but they
  are widely implemented in server software.

Passive DNS: A mechanism to collect large amounts of DNS data by

  storing DNS responses from servers.  Some of these systems also
  collect the DNS queries associated with the responses; this can
  raise privacy issues.  Passive DNS databases can be used to answer
  historical questions about DNS zones such as which records were
  available for them at what times in the past.  Passive DNS
  databases allow searching of the stored records on keys other than
  just the name, such as "find all names which have A records of a
  particular value".

Anycast: "The practice of making a particular service address

  available in multiple, discrete, autonomous locations, such that
  datagrams sent are routed to one of several available locations."
  (Quoted from RFC4786, Section 2)

Zones

This section defines terms that are used when discussing zones that are being served or retrieved.

Zone: "Authoritative information is organized into units called

  'zones', and these zones can be automatically distributed to the
  name servers which provide redundant service for the data in a
  zone."  (Quoted from RFC1034, Section 2.4)

Child: "The entity on record that has the delegation of the domain

  from the Parent."  (Quoted from RFC7344, Section 1.1)

Parent: "The domain in which the Child is registered." (Quoted from

  RFC7344, Section 1.1) Earlier, "parent name server" was defined
  in RFC882 as "the name server that has authority over the place
  in the domain name space that will hold the new domain".  (Note
  that RFC882 was obsoleted by RFC1034 and RFC1035.)  RFC819
  also has some description of the relationship between parents and
  children.

Origin:

  (a) "The domain name that appears at the top of a zone (just below
  the cut that separates the zone from its parent).  The name of the
  zone is the same as the name of the domain at the zone's origin."
  (Quoted from RFC2181, Section 6.)  These days, this sense of
  "origin" and "apex" (defined below) are often used
  interchangeably.
  (b) The domain name within which a given relative domain name
  appears in zone files.  Generally seen in the context of
  "$ORIGIN", which is a control entry defined in RFC1035,
  Section 5.1, as part of the master file format.  For example, if
  the $ORIGIN is set to "example.org.", then a master file line for
  "www" is in fact an entry for "www.example.org.".

Apex: The point in the tree at an owner of an SOA and corresponding

  authoritative NS RRset.  This is also called the "zone apex".
  RFC4033 defines it as "the name at the child's side of a zone
  cut".  The "apex" can usefully be thought of as a data-theoretic
  description of a tree structure, and "origin" is the name of the
  same concept when it is implemented in zone files.  The
  distinction is not always maintained in use, however, and one can
  find uses that conflict subtly with this definition.  RFC1034
  uses the term "top node of the zone" as a synonym of "apex", but
  that term is not widely used.  These days, the first sense of
  "origin" (above) and "apex" are often used interchangeably.

Zone cut: The delimitation point between two zones where the origin

  of one of the zones is the child of the other zone.
  "Zones are delimited by 'zone cuts'.  Each zone cut separates a
  'child' zone (below the cut) from a 'parent' zone (above the cut).
  (Quoted from RFC2181, Section 6; note that this is barely an
  ostensive definition.)  Section 4.2 of RFC1034 uses "cuts" as
  'zone cut'."

Delegation: The process by which a separate zone is created in the

  name space beneath the apex of a given domain.  Delegation happens
  when an NS RRset is added in the parent zone for the child origin.
  Delegation inherently happens at a zone cut.  The term is also
  commonly a noun: the new zone that is created by the act of
  delegating.

Glue records: "[Resource records] which are not part of the

  authoritative data [of the zone], and are address resource records
  for the [name servers in subzones].  These RRs are only necessary
  if the name server's name is 'below' the cut, and are only used as
  part of a referral response."  Without glue "we could be faced
  with the situation where the NS RRs tell us that in order to learn
  a name server's address, we should contact the server using the
  address we wish to learn."  (Definition from RFC1034,
  Section 4.2.1)
  A later definition is that glue "includes any record in a zone
  file that is not properly part of that zone, including nameserver
  records of delegated sub-zones (NS records), address records that
  accompany those NS records (A, AAAA, etc), and any other stray
  data that might appear" (RFC2181, Section 5.4.1).  Although glue
  is sometimes used today with this wider definition in mind, the
  context surrounding the RFC2181 definition suggests it is
  intended to apply to the use of glue within the document itself
  and not necessarily beyond.

In-bailiwick:

  (a) An adjective to describe a name server whose name is either
  subordinate to or (rarely) the same as the zone origin.  In-
  bailiwick name servers require glue records in their parent zone
  (using the first of the definitions of "glue records" in the
  definition above).
  (b) Data for which the server is either authoritative, or else
  authoritative for an ancestor of the owner name.  This sense of
  the term normally is used when discussing the relevancy of glue
  records in a response.  For example, the server for the parent
  zone "example.com" might reply with glue records for
  "ns.child.example.com".  Because the "child.example.com" zone is a
  descendant of the "example.com" zone, the glue records are in-
  bailiwick.

Out-of-bailiwick: The antonym of in-bailiwick.

Authoritative data: "All of the RRs attached to all of the nodes

  from the top node of the zone down to leaf nodes or nodes above
  cuts around the bottom edge of the zone."  (Quoted from RFC1034,
  Section 4.2.1) It is noted that this definition might
  inadvertently also include any NS records that appear in the zone,
  even those that might not truly be authoritative because there are
  identical NS RRs below the zone cut.  This reveals the ambiguity
  in the notion of authoritative data, because the parent-side NS
  records authoritatively indicate the delegation, even though they
  are not themselves authoritative data.

Root zone: The zone whose apex is the zero-length label. Also

  sometimes called "the DNS root".

Empty non-terminals: "Domain names that own no resource records but

  have subdomains that do."  (Quoted from RFC4592, Section 2.2.2.)
  A typical example is in SRV records: in the name
  "_sip._tcp.example.com", it is likely that "_tcp.example.com" has
  no RRsets, but that "_sip._tcp.example.com" has (at least) an SRV
  RRset.

Delegation-centric zone: A zone that consists mostly of delegations

  to child zones.  This term is used in contrast to a zone that
  might have some delegations to child zones, but also has many data
  resource records for the zone itself and/or for child zones.  The
  term is used in RFC4956 and RFC5155, but is not defined there.

Wildcard: RFC1034 defined "wildcard", but in a way that turned out

  to be confusing to implementers.  Special treatment is given to
  RRs with owner names starting with the label "*".  "Such RRs are
  called 'wildcards'.  Wildcard RRs can be thought of as
  instructions for synthesizing RRs."  (Quoted from RFC1034,
  Section 4.3.3) For an extended discussion of wildcards, including
  clearer definitions, see RFC4592.

Occluded name: "The addition of a delegation point via dynamic

  update will render all subordinate domain names to be in a limbo,
  still part of the zone, but not available to the lookup process.
  The addition of a DNAME resource record has the same impact.  The
  subordinate names are said to be 'occluded'."  (Quoted from
  RFC5936, Section 3.5)

Fast flux DNS: This "occurs when a domain is found in DNS using A

  records to multiple IP addresses, each of which has a very short
  Time-to-Live (TTL) value associated with it.  This means that the
  domain resolves to varying IP addresses over a short period of
  time."  (Quoted from RFC6561, Section 1.1.5, with typo
  corrected) It is often used to deliver malware.  Because the
  addresses change so rapidly, it is difficult to ascertain all the
  hosts.  It should be noted that the technique also works with AAAA
  records, but such use is not frequently observed on the Internet
  as of this writing.

Registration Model

Registry: The administrative operation of a zone that allows

  registration of names within that zone.  People often use this
  term to refer only to those organizations that perform
  registration in large delegation-centric zones (such as TLDs); but
  formally, whoever decides what data goes into a zone is the
  registry for that zone.  This definition of "registry" is from a
  DNS point of view; for some zones, the policies that determine
  what can go in the zone are decided by superior zones and not the
  registry operator.

Registrant: An individual or organization on whose behalf a name in

  a zone is registered by the registry.  In many zones, the registry
  and the registrant may be the same entity, but in TLDs they often
  are not.

Registrar: A service provider that acts as a go-between for

  registrants and registries.  Not all registrations require a
  registrar, though it is common to have registrars involved in
  registrations in TLDs.

EPP: The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), which is commonly

  used for communication of registration information between
  registries and registrars.  EPP is defined in RFC5730.

WHOIS: A protocol specified in RFC3912, often used for querying

  registry databases.  WHOIS data is frequently used to associate
  registration data (such as zone management contacts) with domain
  names.  The term "WHOIS data" is often used as a synonym for the
  registry database, even though that database may be served by
  different protocols, particularly RDAP.  The WHOIS protocol is
  also used with IP address registry data.

RDAP: The Registration Data Access Protocol, defined in RFC7480,

  RFC7481, RFC7482, RFC7483, RFC7484, and RFC7485.  The
  RDAP protocol and data format are meant as a replacement for
  WHOIS.

DNS operator: An entity responsible for running DNS servers. For a

  zone's authoritative servers, the registrant may act as their own
  DNS operator, or their registrar may do it on their behalf, or
  they may use a third-party operator.  For some zones, the registry
  function is performed by the DNS operator plus other entities who
  decide about the allowed contents of the zone.

General DNSSEC

Most DNSSEC terms are defined in RFC4033, RFC4034, RFC4035, and RFC5155. The terms that have caused confusion in the DNS community are highlighted here.

DNSSEC-aware and DNSSEC-unaware: These two terms, which are used in

  some RFCs, have not been formally defined.  However, Section 2 of
  RFC4033 defines many types of resolvers and validators,
  including "non-validating security-aware stub resolver", "non-
  validating stub resolver", "security-aware name server",
  "security-aware recursive name server", "security-aware resolver",
  "security-aware stub resolver", and "security-oblivious
  'anything'".  (Note that the term "validating resolver", which is
  used in some places in DNSSEC-related documents, is also not
  defined.)

Signed zone: "A zone whose RRsets are signed and that contains

  properly constructed DNSKEY, Resource Record Signature (RRSIG),
  Next Secure (NSEC), and (optionally) DS records."  (Quoted from
  RFC4033, Section 2.)  It has been noted in other contexts that
  the zone itself is not really signed, but all the relevant RRsets
  in the zone are signed.  Nevertheless, if a zone that should be
  signed contains any RRsets that are not signed (or opted out),
  those RRsets will be treated as bogus, so the whole zone needs to
  be handled in some way.
  It should also be noted that, since the publication of RFC6840,
  NSEC records are no longer required for signed zones: a signed
  zone might include NSEC3 records instead.  RFC7129 provides
  additional background commentary and some context for the NSEC and
  NSEC3 mechanisms used by DNSSEC to provide authenticated denial-
  of-existence responses.

Unsigned zone: Section 2 of RFC4033 defines this as "a zone that

  is not signed".  Section 2 of RFC4035 defines this as "A zone
  that does not include these records [properly constructed DNSKEY,
  Resource Record Signature (RRSIG), Next Secure (NSEC), and
  (optionally) DS records] according to the rules in this section".
  There is an important note at the end of Section 5.2 of RFC4035
  that defines an additional situation in which a zone is considered
  unsigned: "If the resolver does not support any of the algorithms
  listed in an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver will not be
  able to verify the authentication path to the child zone.  In this
  case, the resolver SHOULD treat the child zone as if it were
  unsigned."

NSEC: "The NSEC record allows a security-aware resolver to

  authenticate a negative reply for either name or type non-
  existence with the same mechanisms used to authenticate other DNS
  replies."  (Quoted from RFC4033, Section 3.2.)  In short, an
  NSEC record provides authenticated denial of existence.
  "The NSEC resource record lists two separate things: the next
  owner name (in the canonical ordering of the zone) that contains
  authoritative data or a delegation point NS RRset, and the set of
  RR types present at the NSEC RR's owner name."  (Quoted from
  Section 4 of RFC 4034)

NSEC3: Like the NSEC record, the NSEC3 record also provides

  authenticated denial of existence; however, NSEC3 records mitigate
  against zone enumeration and support Opt-Out.  NSEC3 resource
  records are defined in RFC5155.
  Note that RFC6840 says that RFC5155 "is now considered part of
  the DNS Security Document Family as described by Section 10 of
  RFC4033".  This means that some of the definitions from earlier
  RFCs that only talk about NSEC records should probably be
  considered to be talking about both NSEC and NSEC3.

Opt-out: "The Opt-Out Flag indicates whether this NSEC3 RR may cover

  unsigned delegations."  (Quoted from RFC5155, Section 3.1.2.1.)
  Opt-out tackles the high costs of securing a delegation to an
  insecure zone.  When using Opt-Out, names that are an insecure
  delegation (and empty non-terminals that are only derived from
  insecure delegations) don't require an NSEC3 record or its
  corresponding RRSIG records.  Opt-Out NSEC3 records are not able
  to prove or deny the existence of the insecure delegations.
  (Adapted from RFC7129, Section 5.1)

Zone enumeration: "The practice of discovering the full content of a

  zone via successive queries."  (Quoted from RFC5155,
  Section 1.3.)  This is also sometimes called "zone walking".  Zone
  enumeration is different from zone content guessing where the
  guesser uses a large dictionary of possible labels and sends
  successive queries for them, or matches the contents of NSEC3
  records against such a dictionary.

Key signing key (KSK): DNSSEC keys that "only sign the apex DNSKEY

  RRset in a zone."(Quoted from RFC6781, Section 3.1)

Zone signing key (ZSK): "DNSSEC keys that can be used to sign all

  the RRsets in a zone that require signatures, other than the apex
  DNSKEY RRset."  (Quoted from RFC6781, Section 3.1) Note that the
  roles KSK and ZSK are not mutually exclusive: a single key can be
  both KSK and ZSK at the same time.  Also note that a ZSK is
  sometimes used to sign the apex DNSKEY RRset.

Combined signing key (CSK): "In cases where the differentiation

  between the KSK and ZSK is not made, i.e., where keys have the
  role of both KSK and ZSK, we talk about a Single-Type Signing
  Scheme."  (Quoted from RFC6781, Section 3.1) This is sometimes
  called a "combined signing key" or CSK.  It is operational
  practice, not protocol, that determines whether a particular key
  is a ZSK, a KSK, or a CSK.

Secure Entry Point (SEP): A flag in the DNSKEY RDATA that "can be

  used to distinguish between keys that are intended to be used as
  the secure entry point into the zone when building chains of
  trust, i.e., they are (to be) pointed to by parental DS RRs or
  configured as a trust anchor.  Therefore, it is suggested that the
  SEP flag be set on keys that are used as KSKs and not on keys that
  are used as ZSKs, while in those cases where a distinction between
  a KSK and ZSK is not made (i.e., for a Single-Type Signing
  Scheme), it is suggested that the SEP flag be set on all keys."
  (Quoted from RFC6781, Section 3.2.3.)  Note that the SEP flag is
  only a hint, and its presence or absence may not be used to
  disqualify a given DNSKEY RR from use as a KSK or ZSK during
  validation.

DNSSEC Policy (DP): A statement that "sets forth the security

  requirements and standards to be implemented for a DNSSEC-signed
  zone."  (Quoted from RFC6841, Section 2)

DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS): "A practices disclosure document

  that may support and be a supplemental document to the DNSSEC
  Policy (if such exists), and it states how the management of a
  given zone implements procedures and controls at a high level."
  (Quoted from RFC6841, Section 2)

DNSSEC States

A validating resolver can determine that a response is in one of four states: secure, insecure, bogus, or indeterminate. These states are defined in RFC4033 and RFC4035, although the two definitions differ a bit. This document makes no effort to reconcile the two definitions, and takes no position as to whether they need to be reconciled.

Section 5 of RFC4033 says:

  A validating resolver can determine the following 4 states:
  Secure: The validating resolver has a trust anchor, has a chain
     of trust, and is able to verify all the signatures in the
     response.
  Insecure: The validating resolver has a trust anchor, a chain
     of trust, and, at some delegation point, signed proof of the
     non-existence of a DS record.  This indicates that subsequent
     branches in the tree are provably insecure.  A validating
     resolver may have a local policy to mark parts of the domain
     space as insecure.
  Bogus: The validating resolver has a trust anchor and a secure
     delegation indicating that subsidiary data is signed, but
     the response fails to validate for some reason: missing
     signatures, expired signatures, signatures with unsupported
     algorithms, data missing that the relevant NSEC RR says
     should be present, and so forth.
  Indeterminate: There is no trust anchor that would indicate that a
     specific portion of the tree is secure.  This is the default
     operation mode.

Section 4.3 of RFC4035 says:

  A security-aware resolver must be able to distinguish between four
  cases:
  Secure: An RRset for which the resolver is able to build a chain
      of signed DNSKEY and DS RRs from a trusted security anchor to
      the RRset.  In this case, the RRset should be signed and is
      subject to signature validation, as described above.
  Insecure: An RRset for which the resolver knows that it has no
     chain of signed DNSKEY and DS RRs from any trusted starting
     point to the RRset.  This can occur when the target RRset lies
     in an unsigned zone or in a descendent [sic] of an unsigned
     zone.  In this case, the RRset may or may not be signed, but
     the resolver will not be able to verify the signature.
  Bogus: An RRset for which the resolver believes that it ought to
     be able to establish a chain of trust but for which it is
     unable to do so, either due to signatures that for some reason
     fail to validate or due to missing data that the relevant
     DNSSEC RRs indicate should be present.  This case may indicate
     an attack but may also indicate a configuration error or some
     form of data corruption.
  Indeterminate: An RRset for which the resolver is not able to
     determine whether the RRset should be signed, as the resolver
     is not able to obtain the necessary DNSSEC RRs.  This can occur
     when the security-aware resolver is not able to contact
     security-aware name servers for the relevant zones.

10. Security Considerations

These definitions do not change any security considerations for the DNS.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

RFC882 Mockapetris, P., "Domain names: Concepts and facilities",

          RFC 882, DOI 10.17487/RFC0882, November 1983,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc882>.

RFC1034 Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",

          STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

RFC1035 Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and

          specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
          November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

RFC1123 Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -

          Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.

RFC1996 Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone

          Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1996,
          August 1996, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>.

RFC2136 Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,

          "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
          RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.

RFC2181 Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS

          Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181>.

RFC2182 Elz, R., Bush, R., Bradner, S., and M. Patton, "Selection

          and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers", BCP 16, RFC 2182,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC2182, July 1997,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2182>.

RFC2308 Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS

          NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.

RFC4033 Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.

          Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
          RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

RFC4034 Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.

          Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
          RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

RFC4035 Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.

          Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
          Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.

RFC4592 Lewis, E., "The Role of Wildcards in the Domain Name

          System", RFC 4592, DOI 10.17487/RFC4592, July 2006,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4592>.

RFC5155 Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS

          Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
          Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.

RFC5730 Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",

          STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.

RFC5936 Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol

          (AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.

RFC6561 Livingood, J., Mody, N., and M. O'Reirdan,

          "Recommendations for the Remediation of Bots in ISP
          Networks", RFC 6561, DOI 10.17487/RFC6561, March 2012,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6561>.

RFC6672 Rose, S. and W. Wijngaards, "DNAME Redirection in the

          DNS", RFC 6672, DOI 10.17487/RFC6672, June 2012,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6672>.

RFC6781 Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC

          Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781>.

RFC6840 Weiler, S., Ed. and D. Blacka, Ed., "Clarifications and

          Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)", RFC 6840,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC6840, February 2013,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6840>.

RFC6841 Ljunggren, F., Eklund Lowinder, AM., and T. Okubo, "A

          Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice
          Statements", RFC 6841, DOI 10.17487/RFC6841, January 2013,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6841>.

RFC6891 Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms

          for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.

RFC7344 Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating

          DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

11.2. Informative References

[DBOUND] IETF, "Domain Boundaries (dbound) Working Group", 2015,

          <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dbound/charter/>.

RFC819 Su, Z. and J. Postel, "The Domain Naming Convention for

          Internet User Applications", RFC 819,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC0819, August 1982,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc819>.

RFC952 Harrenstien, K., Stahl, M., and E. Feinler, "DoD Internet

          host table specification", RFC 952, DOI 10.17487/RFC0952,
          October 1985, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc952>.

RFC1995 Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,

          DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1995>.

RFC3912 Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,

          DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.

RFC4641 Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices",

          RFC 4641, DOI 10.17487/RFC4641, September 2006,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4641>.

RFC4697 Larson, M. and P. Barber, "Observed DNS Resolution

          Misbehavior", BCP 123, RFC 4697, DOI 10.17487/RFC4697,
          October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4697>.

RFC4786 Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast

          Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, DOI 10.17487/RFC4786,
          December 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4786>.

RFC4956 Arends, R., Kosters, M., and D. Blacka, "DNS Security

          (DNSSEC) Opt-In", RFC 4956, DOI 10.17487/RFC4956, July
          2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4956>.

RFC5625 Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines",

          BCP 152, RFC 5625, DOI 10.17487/RFC5625, August 2009,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5625>.

RFC5890 Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for

          Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
          RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.

RFC5891 Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in

          Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC5891, August 2010,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5891>.

RFC5892 Faltstrom, P., Ed., "The Unicode Code Points and

          Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)",
          RFC 5892, DOI 10.17487/RFC5892, August 2010,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5892>.

RFC5893 Alvestrand, H., Ed. and C. Karp, "Right-to-Left Scripts

          for Internationalized Domain Names for Applications
          (IDNA)", RFC 5893, DOI 10.17487/RFC5893, August 2010,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5893>.

RFC5894 Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for

          Applications (IDNA): Background, Explanation, and
          Rationale", RFC 5894, DOI 10.17487/RFC5894, August 2010,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5894>.

RFC6055 Thaler, D., Klensin, J., and S. Cheshire, "IAB Thoughts on

          Encodings for Internationalized Domain Names", RFC 6055,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC6055, February 2011,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6055>.

RFC6265 Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,

          DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.

RFC6365 Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in

          Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.

RFC7129 Gieben, R. and W. Mekking, "Authenticated Denial of

          Existence in the DNS", RFC 7129, DOI 10.17487/RFC7129,
          February 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7129>.

RFC7480 Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the

          Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.

RFC7481 Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the

          Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7481,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>.

RFC7482 Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access

          Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7482>.

RFC7483 Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the

          Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483,
          DOI 10.17487/RFC7483, March 2015,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7483>.

RFC7484 Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data

          (RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March
          2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>.

RFC7485 Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin,

          "Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects",
          RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015,
          <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7485>.

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge all of the authors of DNS-related RFCs that proceed this one. Comments from Tony Finch, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Niall O'Reilly, Colm MacCarthaigh, Ray Bellis, John Kristoff, Robert Edmonds, Paul Wouters, Shumon Huque, Paul Ebersman, David Lawrence, Matthijs Mekking, Casey Deccio, Bob Harold, Ed Lewis, John Klensin, David Black, and many others in the DNSOP Working Group have helped shape this document.

Authors' Addresses

Paul Hoffman ICANN

Email: [email protected]

Andrew Sullivan Dyn 150 Dow Street, Tower 2 Manchester, NH 03101 United States

Email: [email protected]

Kazunori Fujiwara Japan Registry Services Co., Ltd. Chiyoda First Bldg. East 13F, 3-8-1 Nishi-Kanda Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0065 Japan

Phone: +81 3 5215 8451 Email: [email protected]